segunda-feira, fevereiro 27, 2017

Ashley Mackenzie  -  http://ift.tt/1hwRova  -...











Ashley Mackenzie  -  http://ift.tt/1hwRova  -  http://ift.tt/2lW5Q86  -  http://ift.tt/2muslyN  -  http://ift.tt/2fOSVjr  -  https://twitter.com/_ashmackenzie?lang=es

Tiara of the Deep Ones.This is headgear worn by fish dudes off...



Tiara of the Deep Ones.

This is headgear worn by fish dudes off the coast of New England.  The Tiara has no magical powers; it’s just a fashion choice.  Like a MAGA hat.

Slick black 1959 Cadillac.



Slick black 1959 Cadillac.

Maria Nguyen  -  http://ift.tt/2mAXznj - ...

Design by  min .





















Design by  min .

domingo, fevereiro 26, 2017

Sweeter than a cherry or two: Motovespa 160Motovespa S.A. had...









Sweeter than a cherry or two: Motovespa 160

Motovespa S.A. had been the Spanish licensee of Piaggio from 1952 until the 90s

Luke Choice| Follow us on instagram |



Luke Choice

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Rt0no  -  https://twitter.com/rt0no  -...

Late last year, Thomas Fox-Brewster of Forbes uncovered a strange search warrant among a pile of unsealed documents. The warrant -- approved by a magistrate judge -- allowed law enforcement officers to demand that everyone present at the searched location provide their fingerprints to unlock devices seized from the same location.
In support of its request, the government cited cases dating back to 1910, as though they had any relevance to the current situation. The most recent case cited was 30 years old -- still far from easily applicable to today's smartphones, which are basically pocket-sized personal data centers.
The judge granted it, stating that demands for fingerprints, passwords, or anything (like encryption keys) that might give law enforcement access to the devices' content did not implicate the Fourth or Fifth Amendments. While the magistrate was correct that no court has found the application of fingerprints to unlock devices to be a violation of the Fifth Amendment, the other access options (passwords, encryption keys) might pose Fifth Amendment problems down the road.
Riana Pfefferkorn has uncovered a similar warrant request, but this one has been rejected by the magistrate judge. Pretty much across the board, the order is the antithesis of the one revealed last year. The judge finds [PDF] that the broad request to force everyone present at the residence to apply their fingerprints to seized devices to unlock them implicates multiple Constitutional amendments.
The issues presented in this warrant application are at the cross section of protections provided by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Essentially, the government seeks an order from this Court that would allow agents executing this warrant to force "persons at the Subject Premises" to apply their thumbprints and fingerprints to any Apple electronic device recovered at the premises. (See Attach. B, tT 12.) The request is neither limited to a particular person nor a particular device. And, as noted below, the request is made without any specific facts as to who is involved in the criminal conduct linked to the subject premises, or specific facts as to what particular Apple-branded encrypted device is being employed (if any).
The judge notes the government is able to detain and search persons located at the premises being searched, but that does not extend to forcing every single person in a residence at the time of a search to comply with attempts to unlock seized devices. Because the warrant affidavit contained no particularity about the devices or who in the household the government suspected of engaging in criminal activity, the court can't find anything that justifies the broad, inclusive language contained in the request.
This Court agrees that the context in which fingerprints are taken, and not the fingerprints themselves, can raise concerns under the Fourth Amendment. In the instant case, the government is seeking the authority to seize any individual at the subject premises and force the application of their fingerprints as directed by government agents. Based on the facts presented in the application, the Court does not believe such Fourth Amendment intrusions are justified based on the facts articulated.
The court has other problems with the affidavit -- beyond the government's unwarranted extension of Fourth/Fifth Amendment jurisprudence to cover any devices/fingerprints encountered at a searched location. Early in the order, it notes the government is deploying boilerplate nearly as outdated as its case citiations.
Despite the apparent seriousness of the offenses involved, the Court notes that some of the "boilerplate" background information included in the warrant is a bit dated, such as its explanation that "[t]he internet allows any computer to connect to another computer [so] [e]lectronic contact can be made to millions of computers around the world;" its explanation that a "Blackberry" is a common "Personal Digital Assistant" and its suggestion that the use of "cloud technology" is the exceptional way of transferring files and that transferring images to a computer by directly connecting a cable to a camera or other recording device is the expected means of data transfer.
The judge notes outdated boilerplate isn't enough to undo probable cause assertions, but it certainly doesn't help -- especially not when the government is requesting this sort of broad permission.
The inclusion of this somewhat dated view of technology certainly does not distract from the application's goal of establishing probable cause. However, the dated "boilerplate language" is problematic for what is not included. There is absolutely no discussion of wireless internet service and the possibilities and capabilities that wireless service presents in this context. For example, an unsophisticated intemet user, or a careless one, may fail to properly encrypt his wireless service or may share the password injudiciously. Such practices leave open the possibility that it is not an inhabitant of the subject premises that has used the internet to gather and distribute child pornography, but rather it is a person who has access to the internet service at the subject premises.
Obviously, this possibility holds true in all investigations that track the investigation outlined in the instant application. The limitations of this investigation are not fatal to establishing probable cause, but, in the Court's view, these limitations do impact the ability of the government to seek the extraordinary authority related to compelling individuals to provide their fingerprints to unlock an Apple electronic device.
Then there's the other assertions. The government's application does nothing to narrow down which resident it's seeking or what device(s) might contain evidence of criminal activity. What it does appear to be certain about -- for reasons not included in the application -- is that the devices it seeks are Apple products. A footnote in the order questions this assertion.
Why Apple devices are likely to be found at the premises is not explained. The Court is aware that Apple has a large market share in online hardware, but Microsoft's Windows operating systems continue to dominate the overall market share of operating systems used.
What makes these broad, unsupported assertions even worse, especially when combined with the outdated boilerplate, is that this is apparently the direction the government is heading with its search warrants.
In closing, upon presentation of the warrant application to this Court, the government identified for this Court that the warrant application was seeking the forced fingerprinting discussed herein. The government further noted "[t]his is the language that we are making standard in all of our search warrants." This declaration of standardization is perhaps the crux of the problem. As the Court hopes it is plain from the above, the issues presented here require a fact-intensive inquiry both for purposes of the Fourth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment.
More particularity, better probable cause, and fewer assumptions about the Fourth and Fifth Amendment's application in a post-Riley world are what's needed from the government, according to this order. Even though this application was rejected, it's safe to say this same approach has worked elsewhere. We've seen one approved warrant already and there are likely several more safely hidden from the public eye in the government's multitudinous sealed cases.
What's troubling about the government's assertions in this application is its apparent belief it's found an encryption workaround: one that blows past Fourth and Fifth Amendment concerns using little more than boilerplate that still considers cables to be an essential part of "cloud computing," and magistrate judges willing to buy its outdated legal arguments.

Second Amendment does not cover 'weapons of war,' US appeals court finds

"Assault weapons" are not covered by the Second Amendment, a federal appeals court has found.
On Tuesday, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals voted 10-4 to uphold a Maryland law, which bans 45 kinds of guns and places a 10-round limit on gun magazines. The law – implemented after the 2012 Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting that killed 20 students and six teachers in Newtown, Conn. – is intended to protect against gun violence.
For Judge Robert King and the majority in this ruling, certain kinds of rifles are “weapons of war,” meaning they are not covered under the Second Amendment for the purpose of self-defense. That distinction is explicitly drawn in the 2008 Supreme Court decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, Mr. King wrote.
Others on the court sided with gun rights advocates, arguing that the right to bear arms does not depend on the weapon chosen, and noting the popularity of military style rifles.
"For a law-abiding citizen who, for whatever reason, chooses to protect his home with a semi-automatic rifle instead of a semi-automatic handgun, Maryland's law clearly imposes a significant burden on the exercise of the right to arm oneself at home,” wrote Judge William Traxler in a dissent, calling for a stringent review of the decision. 
In the wake of shootings like Sandy Hook and Orlando, where so-called military-style "assault" rifles were used, local communities and advocacy groups have pushed for limits on the types of weapons available for sale. After the Orlando shooting, 57 percent of Americans supported a nationwide ban on assault weapons, according to a CBS News poll.
Similar gun control bills have struggled to gain traction in Congress, leaving states to implement their own bans as they see fit. Currently, seven states and the District of Columbia have enacted laws banning semiautomatic rifles, according to the Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence, a gun control advocacy group.
Some of these laws have faced legal challenges on Second Amendment grounds. In the case of Maryland, the National Rifle Association is exploring its options for appealing the ruling, NRA spokeswoman Jennifer Baker told the Associated Press.
"It is absurd to hold that the most popular rifle in America is not a protected 'arm' under the Second Amendment,“ she said, saying the NRA estimates between 5 million and 10 million AR-15s are currently owned legally in the United States. That means, she indicated, that the Maryland ruling goes against a provision in D.C. v. Heller that protects weapons that are in common and lawful use at the time from being banned.
The US Supreme Court has been reluctant to hear such Second Amendment challenges, however. In June, the nation’s highest court declined to take up cases against similar gun bans in New York and Connecticut. 
Legal scholars suggest the Supreme Court typically won’t get involved unless lower courts can’t reach consensus. In that way, they say, the Supreme Court gives tacit approval to state bans on certain kinds of guns.
The Maryland law, which supporters say backs up the state’s interest in protecting public safety, is still open to scrutiny at the lower level, and it remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court would consider any Second Amendment challenge.

Federal appeals court rules 2-1, you have the right to film the police

A divided federal appeals court is ruling for the First Amendment, saying the public has a right to film the police. But the 5th US Circuit Court of Appeals, in upholding the bulk of a lower court's decision against an activist who was conducting what he called a "First Amendment audit" outside a Texas police station, noted that this right is not absolute and is not applicable everywhere.
The facts of the dispute are simple. Phillip Turner was 25 in September 2015 when he decided to go outside the Fort Worth police department to test officers' knowledge of the right to film the police. While filming, he was arrested for failing to identify himself to the police. Officers handcuffed and briefly held Turner before releasing him without charges. Turner sued, alleging violations of his Fourth Amendment right against unlawful arrest and detention and his First Amendment right of speech.
The 2-1 decision Thursday by Judge Jacques Wiener is among a slew of rulings on the topic, and it provides fresh legal backing for the so-called YouTube society where people are constantly using their mobile phones to film themselves and the police. The American Civil Liberties Union says, "there is a widespread, continuing pattern of law enforcement officers ordering people to stop taking photographs or video in public places and harassing, detaining and arresting those who fail to comply."
A dissenting appellate judge on the case—Edith Brown Clement—wrote Turner was not unlawfully arrested and that the majority opinion from the Texas-based appeals court jumped the gun to declare a First Amendment right here because one "is not clearly established."
Previously, a federal judge had dismissed Turner's allegations, saying the officers involved held so-called "qualified immunity" because the right to film the police was not "clearly established" at the time of the incident. And on appeal, the appellate court upheld this lower court's position. However, the majority then went on to declare a prospective First Amendment right to film the police within the circuit's jurisdiction, which includes Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. That said, this newly announced right does not apply retroactively to Turner:
At the time in question, neither the Supreme Court nor this court had determined whether First Amendment protection extends to the recording or filming of police. Although Turner insists, as some district courts in this circuit have concluded, that First Amendment protection extends to the video recording of police activity in light of general First Amendment principles, the Supreme Court has "repeatedly" instructed courts "not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality."
The Supreme Court still has not ruled on the issue. The appeals court went on to note the varying rulings and silence in the lower courts on this hot-button First Amendment topic:
The circuit courts are not split, however, on whether the right exists. The First and Eleventh Circuits have held that the First Amendment protects the rights of individuals to videotape police officers performing their duties. In American Civil Liberties Union v. Alvarez, the Seventh Circuit explained that the First Amendment protects the audio recording of the police and concluded that an Illinois wiretapping statute, which criminalized the audio recording of police officers, merited heightened First Amendment scrutiny because of its burdens on First Amendment rights. No circuit has held that the First Amendment protection does not extend to the video recording of police activity, although several circuit courts have explained that the law in their respective circuits is not clearly established while refraining from determining whether there is a First Amendment right to record the police.
Again, the appeals court ruled that the police were ultimately immune to Turner's First Amendment challenge since the right was not "clearly established" at the time of the incident. The court noted that, starting now, "we conclude that First Amendment principles, controlling authority, and persuasive precedent demonstrate that a First Amendment right to record the police does exist, subject only to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions."
Filming the police contributes to the public’s ability to hold the police accountable, ensure that police officers are not abusing their power, and make informed decisions about police policy. Filming the police also frequently helps officers; for example, a citizen’s recording might corroborate a probable cause finding or might even exonerate an officer charged with wrongdoing.
Regarding the Fourth Amendment argument, the court set aside Turner's unlawful detention claim because police held an objectively reasonable position "that Turner was casing the station for an attack, stalking an officer, or otherwise preparing for criminal activity, and thus could have found Turner’s filming of the 'routine activities' of the station sufficiently suspicious to warrant questioning and a brief detention."
So for now, the unlawful arrest claim survived, meaning the cops can be sued on Fourth Amendment grounds. "The officers’ handcuffing Turner and placing him in the patrol car, as alleged in the amended complaint, were not reasonable under the circumstances," the court concluded.
 The painful death of a diabetic boy who was so emaciated he appeared mummified could have been avoided if his parents had not isolated and neglected him for years, a judge said Friday in finding the couple guilty of first-degree murder.
Justice Karen Horner said Emil Radita, 60, and Rodica Radita, 54, were equally guilty of murdering 15-year-old Alexandru.
The boy, who was one of the Raditas’ eight children, weighed less than 37 pounds when he died in 2013 of complications due to untreated diabetes and starvation.
“Mr. and Mrs. Radita intended to and did isolate Alex from anyone who could intervene or monitor his insulin treatment aside from themselves,” said Horner. 
“Alex died as a result of bacterial sepsis brought on by extreme starvation. His physical condition at death was not a sudden or quick occurrence but rather took place over months and possibly, probably years.”
Horner said by isolating Alex he was unlawfully confined and totally reliant on his parents. She said it was also clear that the Raditas knew what they were doing in denying him a sufficient amount of insulin and the long-term consequences.
“The evidence underscores that the Raditas were well aware how ill Alex was and still refused to treat his medical condition with proper insulin protocol and medical care,” she said.
“They knew he was dying.”
Neither parent showed any emotion or had a comment during sentencing.
Justice Horner sentenced them to life in prison with no chance of parole for 25 years.
“Your actions in starving your son Alex to death are beyond comprehension. You persisted in arrogant confidence…until he was dead.”
Witnesses testified that the Raditas refused to accept that their son had diabetes and failed to treat his disease until he was hospitalized near death in British Columbia in 2003.
B.C. social workers apprehended Alexandru after his October 2003 hospital admission and placed him in foster care — where he thrived — for nearly a year before he was returned to his family, who eventually moved to Alberta.
Patricia MacDonald, the B.C. social worker who fought against Alex being returned to his parents, was in court for the verdict.
‘I’m happy with the verdict. I think that it really is justice for Alex. He went through a horrible ending to his life and I’m glad to see his parents being held accountable,” said MacDonald.
She said she wanted to see the Raditas one final time.
“I just feel like they’re so empty. They’re void of any kind of emotion, any kind of feeling. I’ve never met parents like them in my life.”
Testimony also indicated that after the family moved to Alberta, he was enrolled in an online school program for one year, but never finished. There was no evidence that the boy ever saw a doctor, although he did have an Alberta health insurance number.
The trial heard that the parents’ religious beliefs included not going to doctors.
The day the Alexandru died, the family went to church and said that the boy had died, but that God had resurrected him.
“This was a really difficult case for all involved. The facts that Justice Horner found were such that you really did see the magnitude of Alex’s suffering, how long it was and how extensive it was,” said Crown prosecutor Susan Pepper.
“Certainly the evidence that was presented in court does show that the system and the social safety net in our province and in our country did fail Alex.”
Pepper said she hopes that Alex’s case eventually leads to changes in how children in care are tracked in the future.